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Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and thought in roughly 
chronological order, but, inevitably (i.e., like everyone else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper 
context and gets some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that 
W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this 
book that he laid out the foundations of the modern concept of intentionality (roughly, personality or higher 
order thought) which has been further advanced by many (most notably in philosophy by John Searle in “The 
Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, which he called dispositions or 
inclinations, (now often called propositional attitudes), differentiating them from perceptions, memories and 
actions and showing how they lack truth value. He notes that W spent much of his time discussing the 
foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation as to how this relates to his work on language 
and logic. In fact, as W came to realize, they are all names for groups of functions of our innate psychology with 
many differences and none are dependent on the others. It is not really made clear that all our behavior 
depends on the unquestionable axioms of our evolved psychology and thus differs totally from the testable 
empirical facts which they enable us to discover. It is not explained that W’s frequent references to “grammar” 
and to “language games” refer to our innate psychology. All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s terms)-- (i.e., judging, feeling, 
remembering, believing etc.)-- as behaviors and not as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it 
clear that another pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and cannot be 
mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected the possibility of a private language. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the nature of language but (again the 
universal failing) does not make it clear that language is for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive 
with thought (public behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. Like most people, 
philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken the final step towards understanding and 
describing behavior from an evolutionary standpoint, the only viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of 
anything. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested 
in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the 
Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. 
Broad (who did not understand nor like him). ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy  to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born 
ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same 
part of the world and like Einstein  nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse 
with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often    
mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing 
more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly  from occasional lectures and 
students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages  of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with,  often, no clear relationship to sentences before or 
after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, 
underlinings and crossed out words so  that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut 
this indigestible mass    into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of 
capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works  
and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a   century) with 
prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually nobody 
understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many 
physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in 
such extremely abstract and condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he was 
then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of 
modern physics    had only passing and usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; 
that  to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped    the 
monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Over half a century after his death and after decades of relative neglect (considering  he is viewed 
by some as the greatest natural psychologist of all time) Wittgenstein is again attracting 
considerable attention. Though there are hundreds of books dealing wholely or in large part with 
him, few have really grasped his remarkable advances in understanding behavior, so this fresh 
look is most   welcome. 
 
Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and thought in 
roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone else) it fails,   in my view, to place 
his work in proper context and gets some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that 
philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or 
evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid out the foundations 
of the modern concept of intentionality (roughly, personality or higher order thought) which has 
been further advanced by many (most noteably in philosophy by John Searle in “The 
Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, which he called 
dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional attitudes), differentiating them from 
perceptions, memories and actions and showing how they lack truth value.   He notes that W 
spent much of his time discussing the   foundations 
of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation as to how this relates to his work on 
language and logic. In fact, as W came to realize, they are all names for groups of functions of 
our innate psychology with many differences and none are dependent on the others. It is not 
really made clear that all our behavior depends on the unquestionable axioms of our evolved 
psychology and thus differs totally from the testable empirical facts which they enable us to 
discover. It is not explained that W’s frequent references to “grammar” and to “language 
games” refer to our innate psychology.  All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
Kanterian notes (p41) that in W’s first talk on philosophy, given in 1912 at the age of 23, he is 
reported to have said that philosophy is the totality of all propositions that are taken as 
unprovable and basic in science. If one understands that “philosophy” is observational 
psychology, and that “propositions” are sentences which depend for intelligibility (truth) on the 
innate axioms of our psychology, it appears that W understood the basic problem of philosophy 
(behavior), and its answer in what I see as the modern two systems of thought, right from the 
beginning—a feat few have accomplished to this day. He again made this crystal clear in a letter 
to Russell quoted by Kanterian (p86) in which he stated that the point of TLP  : 
 
“is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions –i.e., by language-(and which comes 
to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only 
shown (gezeigt) which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. “ 
 
Note also W’s identification of thought with language and his rejection of the idea that there is, 
between language and thought, another entity such as “the language of thought”, a point which 
he discussed directly and indirectly for the next 30 years but which still bedevils behavioral 
literature nearly a century later--another sad consequence of the oblivion to one of our greatest 
teachers. 
 
Kanterian describes the famous distinction in W’s Tractatus between what can be said and what 
can only be shown but does not explain that one can understand this in terms of W’s later 
denotation of the difference between our axiomatic innate psychology, which submits to no test 
(e.g., this is my hand, I am reading this page etc.), and the factual or empirical applications of this 
evolved axiomatic system (i.e., our intentionality). Perhaps one should not fault Kanterian, since, to 
my knowledge,   nobody else has noticed what I regard as this basic and essential interpretation of 
W’s TLP either—though a few have noticed it in his later work. It is essential to    understand this 
distinction because any description (following W’s frequent injunction that we cannot EXPLAIN 
but only DESCRIBE our psychology) of animal behavior must do so in terms of evolution for the 
same reasons we must describe the genetics, physiology, anatomy and function of the heart in 
evolutionary terms. The alternative “blank slate” view that heart functioning is a matter of one’s 
environment is just as preposterous for the brain. 
 
He does a good job (eg, pg 170-171) of describing (as have others, notably Hacker) W’s transition 
from the confusions of TLP to the clarity of his later work, but (again in my view following 
universal practice) does not really grasp that W’s ideas of the “atomic facts” and “crystalline 
logic” that formed the foundations of his TLP world view evolved into the notions of an innate 
axiomatic psychology that he explicated for the last 20 years of his  life. 
 He also notes (p80) that by discovering the innateness of “depth grammar” (i.e., our inherited 
psychology that makes language (thought) possible), W anticipated Chomsky and others by 
decades. I noticed this some 40 years ago but I have never seen anyone  else point it out, so it’s 
hats off to Kanterian! 
 
With his penetrating understanding of our psychology, W was also prescient about larger issues 
such as the desireability of progress. 
 
“It isn’t absurd... to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for 
humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will 
ultimately by known; that there is nothing good or desireable about scientific knowledge and that 
mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things 
are.” ) (Kanterian p114 from W’s Culture and Value). 
 
Kanterian quotes, without I think fully understanding its implications (again like everyone else 
so far as I know), another very fundamental discovery by W—our natural tendency to subsume 
all uses of a word or sentence under a single meaning rather than recognizing that eg, “space” is 
a complex family of uses or concepts (language games as W liked to call them) with quite 
different applications (meanings) in our life (our intentional psychology). 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s   terms)- 
- (i.e., judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc.)-- as behaviors and not as mental activities 
but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another pioneering discovery of W’s was that 
dispositions describe public actions and cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that 
he so famously rejected the possibility of a private  language. 
 
The probable evolutionary explanation for a route to such usage of disposition words seems to me 
to be that several hundred thousand years ago (give or take) when we evolved the ability to 
vocalize events, objects or actions (i.e., when an animal as agent was involved), sentences first 
substituted for them (get spear, hunt deer) and only later became usable in a dispositional or 
displaced manner (I want you to get the spear, I think we will hunt deer soon).   Again, to my 
knowledge, W was the first to point this out in any detail with such examples as how pain 
language functions (see p  182). 
 
Kanterian describes (p174) how W (so famously and notoriously ) felt he had put an  end to 
philosophy as it was understood and how most philosophers reject this view (or more commonly 
simply ignore it if they are aware of it at all), but his comments that  this narrows the range of what 
we can know by abstract thought and that   metaphysical questions make no sense, seem to me to 
completely miss the point.  I   think W just called our attention to the fact that “knowing” is 
another set of games or psychological functions which we can only accept as they are. Much (we 
might say ALL) of W’s work can be seen as describing how “knowing” works and his last writings 
published as “On Certainty” regarded as the crowning achievement of his life (and of 20th century 
philosophy/psychology). Metaphysical questions have no traction because questioning the axioms 
of our psychology lacks a use in our life (this is not “really” my hand, maybe 2+2=4 is not “really” 
true, perhaps you are not reading this page, etc.). Abstract thought (games, music, math, literature, 
science) is limitless but entirely dependent on the axioms. 
 Kanterian is one of the rare persons who gets it correct (p185) that W rejects a “language of 
thought” for the same reason he rejects private languages and   dispositions such as thinking, 
believing etc. as mental processes(p 180-183); namely that this would make it possible to make 
systematic mistakes in our “translations” of thoughts to actions (e.g., thinking “I want that apple” 
to saying “I want that apple”)  which is absurd. A translation could always be wrong and what test 
could tell us? We lack the criteria for correctness. We would then need some test for showing what 
we really thought! I might say “I want the apple” or “  I don’t want the apple” and what connects 
that to my thought—even for me?  The words are my thoughts (approximately) which are 
descriptions of acts. 
 
Kanterian also mentions that, in spite of the fact that a large percentage of W’s writing concerned 
the philosophy (i.e., psychology) of mathematics, very little attention is paid to his work by most of 
those writing on the foundations of math over the last 50 years. Unfortunately he fails to tell us 
why. One reason is the nearly universal failure to understand what W has done as a result of his 
originality, style, failure to publish and premature death. Another is that it took so long to properly 
gather, translate and edit the 20,000 some pages of his nachlass that several generations have 
grown up without access to the full body of his work. Even to this day some of the German text 
remains untranslated and one of his most famous and largest works—The Big Typescript—was only 
translated and published in 2005.  In addition, many who were regarded as   experts on the subject 
of math and logic (e.g., Dummett, Kreisel, Chihara, Godel) totally failed to understand him and much 
of the writing by others on the foundations of math  is not about its psychological foundations at all 
(of which they are generally oblivious) but about the details of how math is done. The few who 
have made progress in understanding his mathematical comments have been largely ignored (e.g., 
Gefwert, Shanker) or have published so recently that their work has not had time to diffuse (e.g., 
Rodych, Floyd).  Those interested will find further comments and references in my  other reviews.  I 
claim that W’s work on this is continuous with the rest of his corpus, and overall, the most original 
and stimulating ever done. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the nature of language 
but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that language is for humans (as opposed to 
animals) almost coextensive with thought (public behavior as W insisted) and thus with our 
evolved psychology. Like most people, philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and 
taken the final step towards understanding and describing behavior from an evolutionary 
standpoint, the only viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of anything. 
